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Despite the fact that the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that
has been widely used in the last 14 years to investigate different aspects of the sense
of bodily self, very few studies have sought to investigate the subjective nature of the
experience that the RHI evokes. The present study investigates the phenomenology of the
RHI through a specific elicitation method. More particularly, this study aims at assessing
whether the conditions usually used as control in the RHI have an impact in the sense of
body ownership and at determining whether there are different stages in the emergence
of the illusion. The results indicate that far from being “all or nothing,” the illusion induced
by the RHI protocol involves nuances in the type of perceptual changes that it creates.
These perceptual changes affect not only the participants’ perception of the rubber hand
but also the perception of their real hand. In addition, perceptual effects may vary greatly
between participants and, importantly, they evolve over time.
Keywords: rubber hand illusion, sense of body ownership, elicitation interview, micro-genesis, first-person
methods, subjective experience
INTRODUCTION
The “rubber hand” illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm
that has been widely used in the past 14 years to study a funda-
mental aspect of the sense of the bodily self: “the sense of body
ownership” (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004,
2005, 2007; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard,
2007; Tsakiris et al., 2007a,b; Longo et al., 2008; Moseley et al.,
2008a; Capelari et al., 2009; Kammers et al., 2009; Schütz-Bosbach
et al., 2009; Lewis and Lloyd, 2010; Tsakiris, 2010).
In this experimental paradigm a person watches a rubber hand
being stroked in the same location and at the same time as his
or her own hidden hand. After a few minutes, most people get
the curious impression that the rubber hand belongs to them.
There are two requisites for this illusion to work: first, the rub-
ber hand and the real hand have to be stroked at the same time
and in the same place (synchronous stroking); and second, the
rubber hand has to be placed in an anatomically plausible posi-
tion. Generally, if the real hand and the rubber hand are not
stroked synchronously (asynchronous condition), or if the rub-
ber hand is not stroked (non-stroking condition) then the illusion
is not induced. For this reason, these situations have been used
as control conditions in several studies. The two most common
measures used to evaluate the illusion are the displacement of the
felt position of the hidden index finger in the direction of the rub-
ber hand, termed “proprioceptive drift,” and the responses to a
questionnaire.
Previous studies in the literature have assumed that only the
synchronous condition causes a modification in the sense of body
ownership, whereas both the non-stroking and asynchronous
conditions have been assumed to be neutral. We realized that
despite the vast number of studies that have used the RHI in
the past 14 years, very few have sought to investigate the nature
of the experience that the RHI supposedly evokes, more partic-
ularly whether this illusion involves “disownership” of the real
hand in addition to ownership of the rubber hand. Fewer still
have been the studies that have questioned whether the con-
ditions used as controls are effectively neutral with respect to
inducing some kind of illusion. To our knowledge, the only two
studies that have assessed this issue directly are those of Longo
et al. (2008) and Lewis and Lloyd (2010). Longo and collabo-
rators used a psychometric approach to investigate the nature
of the experience of embodiment using the RHI as a model.
This approach involved the factor analysis of a 27-item question-
naire using Principal Components Analysis (PCA). This study
identified certain aspects of the experience that characterize the
synchronous and asynchronous stroking conditions in the RHI
paradigm, and particularly the fact that the asynchronous con-
dition might involve a sense of ownership of the rubber hand.
Lewis and Lloyd (2010) interviewed participants who underwent
a RHI-type procedure, and used interpretative phenomenological
analysis to explore their experience. In their protocol participants
underwent a sequence of three consecutive periods of stroking as
follows: one synchronous, one asynchronous, and then a second
synchronous. The authors used this approach to characterize the
experience of the RHI, considering these three periods as a con-
tinuum. Among other results, they found that the asynchronous
condition did induce some form of the illusion. However, they
did not compare the illusory experiences in the synchronous
and asynchronous conditions. Moreover, none of these studies
assessed the experience of the non-stroking condition.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 659 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Valenzuela Moguillansky et al. Exploring the “Rubber hand” illusion
For these reasons we considered it necessary to carry out a
fuller examination of the phenomenology of the RHI, includ-
ing all of the generally used stroking conditions. An additional
question was derived from a pilot experiment that we carried out.
In this pilot experiment, conducted with individuals who were
trained in a first-person technique called “elicitation interview”
which will be presented in the Methods section, one of the partic-
ipants described a dissociation between the hand (her own or the
rubber hand) where she felt the contact of the paintbrush and the
hand (her own or the rubber hand) where she felt the contact
of the table underneath. As the illusion unfolded the partici-
pant experienced a unification between the hand that was being
touched by the paintbrush and the hand that was touching the
table, suggesting also the presence of different stages in the emer-
gence of the illusion, as illustrated by the following extract of her
description:
“I really have the tactile sensation of my hand lying on the table,
in contact with the table and then, I feel the contact with the brush
which I can’t see.”1
“Progressively the tactile sensation transfers itself into the rubber
hand . . . you see it’s bizarre, because I’m between the two, I have
the tactile sensation of the paintbrush here (indicating the rubber
hand), but I still feel my real hand, the heat of it, the contact with
the table is on the right [with the real hand]. . . it’s bizarre, I have
this partial illusion.”
“Something changed, something changed in the sensation, and
then after a while, well, I felt the. . . I felt not only the brush on my
hand here, there, [on the rubber hand], but I also felt the contact of
my fingers with the piece of cardboard [under the real hand].”
“The illusion will be complete when I have everything [the con-
tact of the fingers with the table and the contact of the brush], in
the rubber hand”
We related these two aspects of touch to the touching/touched
[“touchant”/”touchée”] distinction used by Merleau-Ponty while
discussing the particularities of the experience of “being a body”
(2009 [1945], pp. 121–122). When my left hand is touching my
right hand, my right hand is for my left hand an “object” made of
skin, muscles and bones. At the same time, I feel my right hand
touched by the fingers of my left hand. This double sensation of
touching and being touched is experienced when the hands touch
each other, but also in any tactile sensation: whatever the object,
I may have the feeling of touching it or being touched by it. This
alternation is characteristic of the feeling of recognizing our body
as our own—of the feeling of body ownership. The feeling of being
touchedmay be considered as the passive component of touch, the
feeling of touching as its active component.
In the context of the RHI, we consider the feeling of being
touched by the paintbrush as the passive aspect of touch, and
the feeling of touching the table as its active aspect. Although
the paintbrush is moving, its contact is indeed received passively
by the hand. And although the hand is static on the table, it is
potentially able to explore the table, if not by real movements, at
least through slight changes in pressure or even perhaps imagined
movements.
1Interviews were conducted in French; all the extracts of interviews reported
in this article were translated into English by the authors.
So far, studies on the RHI have assessed whether the passive
aspect of touching, the being touched, is affected by the illusion
(as illustrated by the statement classically used in the RHI ques-
tionnaire: “It seemed as if I was feeling the touch of the paintbrush
in the location where I saw the rubber hand”) but they have never
assessed the active or touching aspect of the situation (the location
of the sensation of touching the table). Therefore, we considered
that it would be interesting to investigate whether the passive and
the active components of touch are both transferred in the RHI,
or whether a dissociation may occur. In addition, we considered
it relevant to determine whether there are different stages in the
perceptual changes linked to the illusion.
Thus, themain objectives of this study are (a) to assess whether
the different stroking conditions in the RHI protocol induce own-
ership of the rubber hand and/or disownership of the real hand,
(b) to investigate whether the RHI involves a transfer of both the
passive and the active components of touch or if the two are dis-
sociated; and (c) to determine whether there are different stages
in the emergence and evolution of the illusion.
In order to do so, we used the “elicitation interview” 2
technique (Vermersch, 1994/2011), a technique stemming from
phenomenology. Using this methodology we gathered detailed
descriptions of participants’ experiences during the classical pro-
tocol of the RHI. The different conditions of stroking were: “syn-
chronous stroking,” which corresponded to synchronous stroking
of the rubber and the real hand; “asynchronous stroking,” in
which the rubber and the real hand were stroked at a different
place in a given time; and the “non-stroking,” in which the rub-
ber hand was not stroked. On the basis of on an analysis of these
descriptions, we identified the features that characterized each
participant’s experience in each stroking condition. We also iden-
tified different phases in the participants’ experiences of the RHI.
Regularities in the participants’ experiences allowed us to high-
light a generic structure of the emergence of the illusion and the
main features of the experience in each stroking condition.
The aim of this study is above all descriptive; the results do
not have a quantitative meaning, and therefore no statistics are
involved.
In what follows, the methodology of the study, the results
of the analysis of the interviews, and a discussion are presented
successively.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Following approval by a local Ethics Committee, the experiment
included 10 participants (9 right-handed; five females; mean
age 31.7 ± 2.1 years) who were informed of the experimental
procedure but not of the hypothesis of the study.
DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment had one independent variable, which was the
type of stroking condition. The stroking conditions were the
synchronous condition, in which the rubber and real hand were
stroked synchronously; the asynchronous condition, in which the
2In French, the name of this technique is “Entretien d’explicitation.” It was
first translated to English as “Explicitation interview.” This year it was agreed
that the English translation would be “Elicitation interviews.”
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rubber and the real hand were stroked at a different place at each
given moment; and the non-stroking condition, where the partic-
ipant looked at the rubber hand but tactile stimulation was given
only to the real hand, and not the rubber hand. The order of
presentation of the conditions was counterbalanced between the
participants.
Interviews were conducted during and after the different
periods of stroking, as prescribed by the elicitation interview
technique.
APPARATUS
In order to induce the RHI, we used a specially constructed card-
board box and a prosthetic hand (Figure 1). The prosthetic hand
was located 20 cm to the right of the right hand. A cardboard
cover was placed on top of the box. When the cover was removed,
the participant could see the rubber hand, and when the cover
was placed over the box, the participant could not.
PROCEDURE
Participants sat in front of a table with their right, stimulated
arm placed through a hole cut in the front of the cardboard
box. The cover was removed and the rubber hand became visible
to the participant. The stroking stimulation period then began
(one of the three stroking conditions described above). During
the stroking period, the participants were asked to describe their
experience using the interview technique explained in the fol-
lowing section. The length of the period of stroking varied
depending on the evolution of the interview. At the end of each
stroking stimulation period, the cover was again placed over
the box. Each participant underwent a total of six experimental
blocks, two for each stroking condition. The order of the condi-
tions was counterbalanced between participants. The experiment
lasted ∼70min.
INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE
The “elicitation interview,” first introduced by Pierre Vermersch
(1994/2011, 1999) and developed in the field of cognitive science
FIGURE 1 | Experimental set up, seen from experimenter’s viewpoint.
Participants placed their right hand inside the cardboard box; they placed
their index finger on a mark. They could see the rubber hand (here on the
right part of the Figure) but not their real hand.
by Claire Petitmengin (1999, 2006), is a technique that attempts
to guide a person to recall a given experience, examine it, and
describe it with great precision. Originally designed to study
the cognitive processes involved in learning, the technique was
then incorporated into the neurophenomenological program
proposed by Francisco Varela (1996) and since then has been
used and tested by a growing number of researchers in the cog-
nitive (e.g., Lutz et al., 2002; Petitmengin et al., 2013), clinical
(Petitmengin et al., 2007), therapeutic (Katz, 2011) and manage-
rial (Remillieux, 2009) fields.
Gathering of the data
In the present study, the gathered descriptions were collected
“in real time,” during induction of the illusion, the interviewees
describing their experience as it unfolded. Other descriptions
were given after the end of the stroking period.
Once the stroking period started, participants were asked to
describe what they perceived or felt whenever they wanted to.
With their agreement, participants’ descriptions were recorded.
In cases where participants spontaneously expressed a particular
feeling, either through words, exclamations or gestures, they were
questioned about what they had just said or expressed. In cases
where they did not spontaneously express any particular feeling,
questions such as “And now, what do you feel?” or “And now
what’s happening?” or “Do you feel anything toward the rubber
hand?” were used to trigger participants’ descriptions. In the cases
where participants preferred not to verbalize during the stroking
period, they were led to evoke the stroking moment immediately
after it was finished, and questions were asked in order to explore
their sensations.
In order to identify whether there was a dissociation between
the passive and active components of touch, in the case that
participants did not refer spontaneously to this issue, we asked
them systematically pre-established questions. The questions
concerned (a) the location of the tactile sensation produced by
the paintbrush (whether on the rubber hand or on the real hand);
(b) the location of the tactile sensation produced by the contact
with the table (whether on the rubber hand or on the real hand).
The following paragraph shows an example of an inter-
view during the synchronous stroking condition. For a detailed
description of the methodology of interview and analysis, see
Petitmengin (1999, 2006) and Valenzuela-Moguillansky (2012).
– Now I have the impression that the hand I see is my own hand.
– How do you know this?
– Because I just moved my fingers, and I said to myself: “Why
does it not move, this hand?”
– Can you come back to this moment? What happens when you
move your fingers?
– (Silence. . .) I can feel the cardboard under my finger, but I see
that hand does not move, I have the feeling that she does not
answer.
– When you have the feeling that she does not answer, what do
you feel?
– I feel my arm like a dead weight, something very heavy. This is
actually quite unpleasant.
– How is this feeling of dead weight, what is it like?
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– Uh. . . I have the impression that my arm is very heavy. Almost
a kind of paralysis, which goes up slowly.
– Which goes up slowly. Until where does it go up slowly?
– It goes up a little in the shoulder. . . my shoulder is like numb.
And I say to myself: “Shit, now my hand is paralyzed, what am
I going to do, how will I get back my hand there?”
Analysis of the data
Once the interview had been transcribed, the first step of the
analysis consisted in setting aside the anecdotal descriptions and
comments and in selecting the relevant information related to the
experience itself. The second step consisted in identifying both
the diachronic and synchronic structure of the participant’s expe-
rience. The diachronic structure corresponds to the successive
phases of the experience, while the synchronic structure corre-
sponds to the characteristics of the experience at a given phase.
In this study, the diachronic analysis consisted in identifying the
participant’s perceptual changes that marked different phases of
the experience in a given stroking condition. This process allowed
the identification of the diachronic structure of the participant’s
experience in a given stroking condition. We then looked at
the experiential categories that characterized each of the phases
previously determined, identifying the synchronic structure of
each phase for a given participant in this stroking condition. In
this way we created an individual representation of the structure
of the experience of each stroking condition for each partici-
pant. We repeated this procedure for each participant and then
compared the individual structures, looking for invariants across
different participants. Based on the invariants, we constructed the
generic structure of the experience for each stroking condition. A
more detailed description of the analysis of the data is provided
in the Appendix and in Valenzuela-Moguillansky (2012).
RESULTS
The identified generic structure of the RHI experience for each
stroking condition is made up of a generic diachronic struc-
ture (Figure 2) and a generic synchronic structure. The generic
diachronic structure is made up of two phases. The first phase
of each stroking condition is composed in turn by a series of
operations or “sub phases” that are organized in a sequential
order. Some participants described certain phases in more detail
than others, and some concentrated their description on only
one phase. The generic synchronic structure is made up of sev-
eral experiential categories that characterize Phase 2 and 2′. These
FIGURE 2 | Generic diachronic structure of each visuo-tactile condition. The name of each visuo-tactile condition appears in blue. Black arrows indicate
sequential order of the phases and sub phases.
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Table 1 | Summary of the experiential categories corresponding to Phases 2 and 2’ in the three stroking conditions.
Synchronous Asynchronous Non-stroking
8/10 7/10 3/10
PHASE 2: ILLUSION
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand
Disregarding the real hand Feeling of ownership of the real hand Delocalization of the real hand
Delocalization of the real hand Attribution of real hand features to the
rubber hand
Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand
Disruption of proprioception Feeling a “numbed” hand Acquisition of rubber hand features
Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand Feeling a phantom sensation Feeling of having a prosthesis
Acquisition of rubber hand features
PHASE 2′: ABSENCE OF THE ILLUSION
Absence of feeling of owning the rubber hand Absence of feeling of owning the
rubber hand
Absence of feeling of owning the rubber hand
Feeling of ownership of the real hand Feeling of ownership of the real hand Feeling of ownership of the real hand
The second row indicates the number of participants out of the total that experienced the illusion in each stroking condition. It is important to note that not all the
participants that experienced the illusion in a given stroking condition described all the experiential categories.
experiential categories are not organized in a sequential order
(Table 1).
In this section we present the generic structure of each stroking
condition. The sub phases and experiential categories are accom-
panied by one or more descriptive statements that illustrate them.
At the end of each descriptive statement, the initials of the partici-
pant are indicated in parentheses. Questions from the interviewer
appear in bold. Key parts of the descriptive statement are in italics.
SYNCHRONOUS STROKING
Phase 1: establishment of the visuo-tactile correlation
In this phase participants felt the tactile sensation from the
paintbrush and established an association between the tactile sen-
sation and what they saw. We identified four “sub phases” that
characterize the diachronic structure of Phase 1.
Sub phase 1: perception of the tactile stimulation. This sub
phases corresponds to participants’ description of feeling the
movement of the paintbrush on their hand.
“. . . [I feel] the tickles of the paintbrush in my right hand”
(C.G.)
Sub phase 2: association between visual and tactile stimulations.
This sub phases includes participants’ description of perceiving
the correspondence between what they saw on the rubber hand
and what they felt in their own hand.
“My sensation is exactly the same as what I see, (. . .) Even
though I know that it’s not my hand” (V.C.)
One participant described having the impression of being able to
predict the tactile sensation from the visual input. We believe that
the “impression of prediction” illustrates a process of association
between visual and tactile stimulation.
“I have a sensation, as if I am watching the paintbrush coming
close to each part of the hand and in certain way I can predict what
I will feel.” (C.V.)
Sub phase 3: beginning of the incorporation of the rubber hand.
This sub phase groups together the passages in which partici-
pants referred to the experience of owning the rubber hand but
in a way that suggested that they were “in the process of” inte-
grating the rubber hand—that the feeling of ownership was not
yet complete. This can be observed mainly through two features
of the participants’ speech: the use of the conditional tense, and
the suggestion that the experience is beginning or is not yet there
but that it could come in the near future.
“I have the impression that if you keep going for another
ten minutes, I could believe that the other hand is my hand,
actually. . .” (G.R.)
“Actually the longer it lasts the more I have exactly this impres-
sion, that it [the illusion] is starting, well the fake hand, I have the
impression that it’s mine.” (H.M.)
Regarding the location of the tactile sensation produced by the
paintbrush and the location of the tactile sensation produced
by the contact with the table, in this phase some participants
described feeling the tactile sensation produced by the paintbrush
on the rubber hand and all of them described feeling the tactile
sensation produced by the contact with the table under their real
hand.
Sub phase 3′: violation of expectations. This sub phase includes
participants’ descriptions of perceiving incongruence between
what they were seeing and what they were feeling. This feeling
was accompanied by a feeling of strangeness or surprise. Although
the stroking of the rubber and real hands was meant to be
synchronous and equal, because it was performed manually, pre-
sumably it was not strictly identical, and small asynchronicities
were present for all participants. Only two participants described
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this as a salient feature of their experience—these were the par-
ticipants that did not experience the illusion in the synchronous
stroking condition.
“It’s crazy! It’s like if it gets a bit detached now, or I don’t know if
you are doing it a little bit shifted or exactly at the same time, but it’s
almost like the sensation (tactile) is a bit before what I am seeing
. . . ” (C.V., 173)
“And there’s something funny . . . sometimes I feel the coldness
of the metal, but I don’t see the metal touching here (. . .) and it
makes me think, it makes me aware that this [the rubber hand] is
not my hand.” (M.W., 45)
In one participant, the awareness of incongruence between the
stroking of the rubber and real hands triggered a chain of real-
izations which ended with the discovery that he had implicitly
incorporated the rubber hand.
“it [the incongruence between what he sees and what he feels]
makes me think that, it makes me become aware that this [the
rubber hand] is not my hand but this means that (laughs), that
if this makes me aware that this one is not my hand, before they were
confused, that’s what I really feel” (M.W., 49)
Phase 2: illusion
This phase corresponds to the illusion itself. We identified six
experiential categories that characterize this phase. From par-
ticipants’ descriptions we could not identify a generic sequen-
tial order between them. Thus, they characterize the synchronic
structure of Phase 2 and not its diachronic structure.
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand. The presence of the
illusion is generally determined by the participants’ spontaneous
report of the feeling that the rubber hand belongs to them.
This category groups together participants’ descriptions of such
a feeling of ownership.
“I really have the impression that the rubber hand is my hand.”
(D.L.)
Disregarding the real hand.
“It’s pretty bizarre because I forget that I have this right hand.”
(V.C.)
Delocalization of the real hand. This subcategory includes
descriptions of the delocalization of the real hand. The descrip-
tions regarding the delocalization of the tactile sensation pro-
duced by the paintbrush were in most cases spontaneous. The
descriptions regarding the delocalization of the tactile sensation
produced by the contact with the table was spontaneous only for
one participant. In the case of the other participants the location
of the tactile sensation produced by the contact with the table was
assessed through the pre-established questions.
Thus, we identified that the delocalization of the participants’
real hand could be evaluated in terms of the following points of
reference:
Location of the tactile stimulation with respect to the hand.
“That is . . . the position, well, . . . the place where I feel the brush
is the place where I see the rubber hand.” (D.L.)
Location of the hand with respect to the table.
“I have the impression that my hand is on the table here (indicat-
ing the rubber hand). . .” (H.M.)
Location of the hand with respect to the rest of the body.
“I feel as if it (the rubber hand) was placed as my hand, in the
prolongation of my arm.” (D.L.)
Disruption of proprioception. This subcategory corresponds to
one participant’s description of not knowing the position of her
real hand. She assimilated the position of her hand to that of the
rubber hand.
“I am very curious to see whether my hand is in the same posi-
tion as this one (the rubber hand) because to me it seems that it’s at
exactly the same position but no . . ..” (I.P.)
Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand. This cat-
egory includes participants’ description of attributing features of
the real hand to the rubber hand. There were different kinds of
features that were attributed to the rubber hand.We have grouped
them into the following categories: agency, life, sensitivity and
texture and warmth.
Acquisition of rubber hand features. In this category are partici-
pants’ descriptions of experiencing their hands as having acquired
the features of the rubber hand. The features are further classified
into different subcategories: texture, marks and color.
Phase 2’: absence of the illusion
This is the final phase of the experience of two participants who
stated that they did not experience a feeling of ownership toward
the rubber hand.
Absence of feeling of owning the rubber hand. This category
includes statements of not feeling ownership of the rubber hand.
“I still don’t feel that the rubber hand is my hand, I don’t yet have
this feeling of ownership.” (C.V., 181)
Feeling of ownership of the real hand. This category includes par-
ticipants’ descriptions of feeling their real hand as present. The
presence of participants’ real hand was expressed by referring to
the localization of their hand. This was done in terms of three
points reference: localization of the tactile stimuli with respect to
the hand; localization of the hand with respect to the table; and
localization of the hand with respect to the rest of the body. In
this case neither the active aspect of touch nor the passive one are
transferred to the rubber hand.
Location of the tactile stimulation with respect to the
hand.
“Where do you feel the paintbrush? On the rubber hand or
on your real hand?
I don’t know (laughs) no, still on my hand I think.” (M.W., 54)
Location of the hand with respect to the table.
“Where do you localize the contact with the table? Under the
rubber hand or under your hand?
Under my hand.” (M.W., 61)
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Location of the hand with respect to the rest of the body.
“But I still feel the connection of my hand with the rest of my
body, ultimately and this sensation has not been transferred to the
rubber hand.” (C.V., 200)
ASYNCHRONOUS STROKING
Seven out of ten participants had some kind of illusory experience
in the asynchronous condition.
Phase 1: recognition of visuo-tactile incongruence
As in the synchronous condition, this phase was the one wherein
participants experienced the tactile sensation of the paintbrush.
Contrary to the synchronous condition, in the asynchronous
condition, tactile sensations did not correspond with what par-
ticipants were seeing. This is why, instead of establishing an
association between the visual and tactile stimulation, at this
stage most participants recognized the incongruence between
visual and tactile stimulation.We identified four “sub phases” that
characterize the diachronic structure of Phase 1.
Sub phase 1: expectation of correspondence between the visual
and tactile stimulations. This sub phase includes participants’
expectation of correspondence between visual and tactile stim-
ulations.
“I see the brush and so I expect to feel the physical response . . . ”
(G.R.)
Sub phase 2: perception of the tactile stimulation. This sub phase
includes participants’ descriptions of the tactile sensation of the
paintbrush on their real hand, without doing any mention of
feelings of identification with the rubber hand or any strange
sensation.
“I feel touch from a brush.” (H.M.)
Sub phase 3: perception of incongruence between visual and tac-
tile stimulations. This sub phase includes participants’ descrip-
tions of incongruence between what they were seeing and what
they were feeling. This distinction was sometimes accompanied
by a feeling of strangeness and sometimes not.
“The stimulation is different well, different geographical zones
that are stimulated. . ..” (V.C.)
Sub phase 4: violation of expectations. This sub phase includes
the realization that the tactile stimulation does not correspond
with the visual one. Generally this realization was accompanied
by a feeling of strangeness and confusion.
“Visually I expected to see on the rubber hand what I was feeling
in my hand” (D.L.)
“I see the brush and so I expect to feel the physical response and
it’s really weird not to feel it . . . ” (G.R.)
Sub phase 5: confusion of the location of the real hand. This
sub phase corresponds to participants’ descriptions regarding the
confusion of the location of location of the location of the tactile
sensation elicited by the paintbrush and the location of their arm
with respect to the rest of the body. Contrary to what happened in
the synchronous condition, in the asynchronous condition, par-
ticipants’ descriptions suggested that the confusion in the location
of their hand was a stage that leads to the emergence of the illusion
and not characteristic of the illusion itself.
“Now there’s a sort of confusion, because I, well, my brain sees
that I can’t have two hands, and that I feel in two different places,
I feel in my real hand and I have a little bit of an impression, only
when the brush is touching, not when it doesn’t touch the hand, that
the rubber hand, not necessarily that it belongs to me, but that I feel
something on it.” (D.L.)
“I feel as if my forearm was in the middle (between the real hand
and the rubber hand), maybe not, maybe more on the side of my real
hand in fact” (D.L.)
Sub phase 6: concentration on the rubber hand. This sub phase
corresponds to participants’ descriptions that indicate that con-
centrating on what is happening on the rubber hand leads to the
illusion.
“If I look at the visual contact between the paintbrush and the
rubber hand, then it has simply become my hand” (G.R.)
Phase 2: illusion
This is the phase where participants described having illusory
sensations and feeling ownership of the rubber hand. The illu-
sion was present to different degrees of intensity and with varying
characteristics. A salient feature of this illusion in comparison to
the one in the synchronous condition is the fact that some partic-
ipants experienced a “phantom tactile sensation,” meaning that
they felt the touch where they saw it (on the rubber hand) even
though they were not being stimulated at that moment at the
corresponding location.
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand. As in the synchronous
condition, this category includes descriptions of ownership of
the rubber hand. In the case of the asynchronous condition, the
intensity of this feeling wasmore variable than in the synchronous
condition.
“It is as if it was a little bit my hand [the rubber hand], as if it
was a bit numbed” (J.A.)
“It increased, it increased (the feeling of owning the rubber hand),
because . . . what I feel now is where you brush with the paintbrush,
that’s where I feel, woo! Yes! . . . the sound made by paintbrush is
like . . .
Like what?
Like as if I were feeling it in my skin.” (I.Q.)
Feeling of ownership of the real hand. This category includes par-
ticipants’ descriptions of feeling the presence of their real hand
and ownership of the rubber hand at the same time.
“It’s very strange . . . yes, the rubber hand is still part of my
body, but in a less obvious way and my other hand becomes more
present, but not yet in a definitive way.” (I.P.)
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“And the table under your hand, do you feel it under your
hand or under the rubber hand?
So under my real hand, my physical hand at the level of the
table.” (D.L.)
We can observe that, contrary to what happened in the syn-
chronous condition, in the asynchronous condition there is no
transfer of the active or passive aspects of touch during the illu-
sion. As presented in the sub phase 5, participants’ descriptions
suggest a confusion regarding the localization of the tactile sensa-
tion produced by the paintbrush and in the location of the arm
with respect to their body. However, participants’ ability to local-
ize their real hand with respect to the table does not seem to be
disrupted.
Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand. As in
the synchronous condition, this category includes participants’
attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand.
Movements.
“I just felt that my hand made these involuntary movements,
and it’s as if at any time the rubber hand could do the same
thing . . . ” (C.V.)
Life.
“It [the rubber hand] began to acquire more life (. . .) but it’s
not that it necessarily belonged to me, as an extension of my body”
(C.V.)
Feeling a “numbed” hand. This category is specific to the asyn-
chronous condition and includes the reports of two participants
who described having the feeling that the rubber hand belonged
to them but as if it were numb.
“I feel like when your hand is numbed, when you fall asleep on
your hand and you have to take it and move it around” (M.W.)
Feeling a phantom sensation. This category is specific to the
asynchronous condition and includes participants’ descriptions
of feeling a phantom tactile sensation on their real hand at the
location where they see the paintbrush touching the rubber hand,
even though they know that the paintbrush is touching a differ-
ent location on their real hand. Here it is important to recall that
the asynchronous condition involves the fact that the rubber hand
that the person sees and the real hand that the person does not
see are stroked at different places at given moment. This category
was present only in participants who underwent the synchronous
condition before the asynchronous condition, suggesting that the
order of the conditions has an impact on what is experienced in
each condition.
“So now really right away I have, as if I felt the ghost [fantasme]
of the brush...That’s it and so I feel it, I feel it. . . not with the same
force... but the illusion of, well the instinct of feeling is so strong
that it creates a sensation. So in the end it’s as if I felt the ghost
[fantasme] of your brush, you see what I mean?” (G.R.)
Phase 2’: absence of the illusion
This phase corresponds to the final stage of the experience for par-
ticipants who did not experience the illusion in the asynchronous
condition.
Absence of feeling of owning the rubber hand.
“. . . now I feel my hand perfectly and the illusion doesn’t work.”
(V.C.)
Feeling of ownership of the real hand. As in the synchronous
condition, participants who did not experience the illusion felt
the presence of their hand mainly through its localization accord-
ing to three points of reference: the localization of the tactile
stimuli with respect to the hand; the localization of the hand with
respect to the table; and the localization of the hand with respect
to the rest of the body.
Location of the tactile stimuli with respect to the hand.
“I feel it clearly, that is, I mean, I feel exactly that there’s a little
tiny bit of pressure from the brush on the hand.” (V.C.)
Location of the hand with respect to the table.
“Indeed the hand will enter a little bit, into a little bit closer
contact with the table, so now I feel also from underneath that it
actually is my fingers that are in contact with that table.” (V.C.)
Location of the hand with respect to the rest of the body.
“I could say that it climbs up the arm, because it doesn’t really
come from the arm, but I feel perfectly that it’s mine.” (V.C.)
NON-STROKING CONDITION
Three out of the ten participants had some kind of illusory expe-
rience in the non-stroking condition. For two of the three partici-
pants who experienced the illusion, the non-stroking condition
was presented after the synchronous condition. For one of the
three participants who experienced the illusion, the non-stroking
condition was the first of the experiment.
Some of the experiential categories seen here are shared with
the previous conditions. In those cases their definitions are not
repeated. Differences are specified where necessary.
Phase 1: recognition of visuo-tactile incongruence
As in the asynchronous condition, this is the phase in which
participants became aware of the incongruence between what
they were seeing and what they were feeling. In the case of the
non-stroking condition the incongruence is even more evident,
because the rubber hand is not being stroked at all.
Sub phase 1: expectation of correspondence between the visual
and tactile stimulations. As in the asynchronous condition, this
sub phase includes participants’ expectation of correspondence
between visual and tactile stimulations. In the case of the non-
stroking condition this phase is implicit, meaning that partici-
pants did not directly express the expectation, but the fact that
participants expressed a violation of what they had been expecting
implies that this expectation had been present.
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Sub phase 2: perception of tactile stimulation. As in the pre-
vious conditions, this sub phase includes participants’ descrip-
tions of the contact of the paintbrush with their hand
without particular reference to ownership or any other strange
sensation.
“Okay. . . for now I’m able to localize it, now it’s on the thumb,
now on the index finger (. . .) it’s pleasant,. . .” (D.L.)
Sub phase 3: awareness of absence of visual stimulus. This sub
phase simply includes descriptions of the absence of the paint-
brush on the rubber hand.
“Well you see the fake hand, but you simply don’t see the brush”
(V.C.)
“The fact that there’s no visual stimulation, just touch. So actu-
ally I concentrate more on the touch on my hand and less on the
visual side. So actually now, the rubber hand doesn’t at all seem
to be me. So I definitely make the distinction on that problem.”
(H.M.)
Sub phase 4: violation of expectation. This sub phase includes
description of the violation of an expectation of correspondence
between the tactile and visual stimuli. Sub phase 1 (Expectation
of correspondence between the visual and tactile stimulations) is
inferred from the presence of this category.
“It’s as if I should feel the brush on the fake hand, but in fact I
feel it somewhere else” (G.R.)
Sub phase 5: projecting tactile sensations onto the rubber hand.
This sub phase includes participants’ descriptions of projecting
the tactile sensation that they were feeling on their real hand onto
the rubber hand.
“I mean, for instance I was trying to follow with my eyes, to look
at the same places that you were touching with the paintbrush on my
hand, but on the rubber hand” (C.V.)
Sub phase 6: concentration on the rubber hand. This sub phase
corresponds to two participants’ descriptions of concentrating on
the sensation elicited by projecting the tactile sensation of the
paintbrush onto the rubber hand.
“Well I was concentrating on that strange sensation.” (G.R.)
Phase 2: illusion
This is the phase in which participants experienced ownership
of the rubber hand and described “unusual feelings.” Only three
participants experienced this phase. In the case of two partic-
ipants, the description of the experience included experiential
categories similar to those associated with the illusion in the
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. In these cases we
called this phase “Standard Illusion.” In the case of one par-
ticipant, the illusion was expressed in a particular way that
we will describe as a subtype of illusion called “Feeling a
Prosthesis.”
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand.
“I start to feel that it was mine [the rubber hand], I mean, I could
even talk about a third limb, no? Because I’m feeling that something
is happening there [on the rubber hand]” (C.G.)
“So, the feeling that the rubber hand is your hand remains?
Yes, no doubt, yes.
And is it more or less intense than before [synchronous
condition]?
More intense” (I.Q.)
Delocalization of the real hand.
“And the table under your hand, where do you feel it? Under
the rubber hand or under your hand?
Now I feel it more under my rubber hand . . . of MY rubber
hand! (Laughs)” (J.A.)
Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand.
Movement.
“It’s crazy, I feel as if the thumb of this hand [rubber hand] had
moved” (I.Q.)
Life.
“What I feel now is as if this [the rubber hand] was my hand, but
as if it was a little bit swollen, I mean as if a wasp had bitten me (. . .)
it’s crazy!” (I.Q.)
Acquisition of rubber hand features. Note that the previous
descriptive statement could be classified as either acquisition of
rubber hand features or attribution of real hand features to the
rubber hand: in the first case, because the participant felt her hand
to be swollen, assimilating the size of the rubber hand, and in the
second, because this change in size was associated with swollen-
ness due to a wasp bite, which is an event that can only occur in a
living hand.
Feeling of owning a prosthesis. One participant described a par-
ticular type of illusion that did not involve the experiential
categories found for the illusion in the synchronous condition:
instead he described an unusual illusory experience that somehow
involved ownership of the rubber hand.
“It’s as if there were a prosthesis, really as if the prosthesis were
my hand” (G.R.)
Phase 2’: absence of the illusion
In this phase the participants recognized the absence of feelings of
identification or ownership toward the rubber hand.
Absence of feeling of owning the rubber hand.
“You don’t manage to let yourself be surprised, to say that it could
be your hand (. . .) I really don’t feel anything” (V.C.)
Feeling of ownership of the real hand.
Location of the tactile stimuli with respect to the hand.
“And toward the fake hand? Is there something or not?
No, I, well I have the sensations in the real hand” (D.L.)
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Global location of the hand.
“I don’t at all have the impression that the fake hand is becom-
ing mine actually. So actually I distinguish them clearly, I know
very well where my hand is actually, no association” (H.M.)
DISCUSSION
The main objective of this study was to carry out a fuller exami-
nation of the phenomenology of the RHI, including the different
stroking conditions involved in this experimental paradigm.More
specifically the objectives were: (a) to assess whether the different
stroking conditions present in the RHI protocol trigger ownership
of the rubber hand and/or disownership of the real hand; (b) to
investigate whether the RHI involves a transfer of both the passive
and the active components of touch or if the two are dissociated;
and (c) to identify the stages of the emergence and evolution of
the illusion in the participants’ experience.
FEELING OF OWNERSHIP AND DISOWNERSHIP ACCORDING TO THE
DIFFERENT STROKING CONDITIONS
Synchronous condition
The results showed that the illusion induced by synchronous
stroking of the rubber and real hands involved a series of expe-
riential categories: “feeling of ownership of the rubber hand,”
“disregarding the real hand,” “delocalization of the real hand,”
“disruption of proprioception,” “attribution of real hand features
to the rubber hand,” and “acquisition of rubber hand features.”
One of the objectives of this study was to determine whether
the illusion involves disownership of the real hand in addition to
the feeling of ownership of the rubber hand. But, how do we iden-
tify disownership? In the present context, disownership refers to
the absence of the real hand from participants’ experience and/or
the removal of the real hand from participants’ internal body
representation. This could be assessed, for instance, by partic-
ipants’ descriptions of “disregarding” their real hand, which in
fact some participants did describe doing. However, if the par-
ticipants did not state explicitly and spontaneously that they had
forgotten their real hand, a problem arises when trying to deter-
mine whether the real hand was “absent” from their experience.
One way to get around this problem is to consider a lack of
descriptions regarding the real hand as an indicator. However,
a lack of description does not necessarily indicate an absence of
experience. In addition, considering that in the RHI attention is
oriented to the rubber hand, participants’ spontaneous reports
generally concerned not their real hand but the rubber hand.
One way to try and resolve this difficulty is by asking partici-
pants about their feelings toward their real hand: the problem in
this case, however, is that the fact of inquiring about their real
hand normally reminds participants of its presence as part of their
bodies.
Therefore, in order to determine whether participants expe-
rienced disownership of their real hand, we could also consider
indirect indicators of disownership, such as participants’ descrip-
tions of the misplacement of their real hand. We considered that
the experiential categories “disregarding the real hand,” “delo-
calization of the real hand,” and “disruption of proprioception”
suggested that the illusion involved disownership of the real hand
as well as ownership of the rubber hand.
These results are in line with the view that the RHI involves a
replacement of the real hand by the rubber hand (e.g., Armel and
Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2007; Moseley et al., 2008a;
Tsakiris, 2010) and go against the view of Schütz-Bosbach et al.
(2009) who argued that there need be no real disownership or
replacement of the participant’s hand and that the rubber hand
could simply be incorporated into the body schema, in addition
to the real hand.
Lewis and Lloyd (2010), who also investigated the subjective
experience of the RHI, identified a component that they labeled
as “change in the location of the hand.” Their category is equiv-
alent to our “delocalization of the real hand,” since both refer to
descriptions of a disruption in the ability to localize the real hand.
In addition, our results suggest that the RHI can affect the ability
to localize one’s own hand with respect to different and possibly
dissociable points of reference: the location of the hand in rela-
tion to tactile stimulation from the paintbrush; the location of
the hand in relation to contact with the table; and the location of
the hand in relation to the rest of the body.
Asynchronous condition
Among the numerous studies that have used the RHI as an exper-
imental paradigm, the asynchronous stroking condition is the
most frequent control condition, considered neutral in terms of
transferring ownership to the rubber hand. But seven out of ten
participants in our study experienced the illusion in the asyn-
chronous condition; importantly, two of them did not experience
the illusion in the synchronous condition. This result reveals a
possibility that has previously been disregarded. Our study shows
that the asynchronous condition was not neutral for seven out
of ten participants, and that it also can give rise to a very pecu-
liar experience. These results confirm those of Lewis and Lloyd
(2010), who found that 84% of their participants experienced
ownership in the asynchronous condition.
The experiential categories that characterize the illusion in the
asynchronous condition involve (a) feeling of ownership of the
rubber hand, (b) feeling of ownership of the real hand, (c) attri-
bution of real hand features to the rubber hand, (d) feeling a
phantom sensation, and (e) feeling a numbed hand.
A peculiarity of the illusion in the asynchronous condition is
that participants felt ownership of the rubber hand and at the
same time they felt the presence of their own hand. Contrary to
the synchronous condition, in the asynchronous condition there
was no disregarding of the real hand: even when participants
could feel ownership of the rubber hand, they still felt that their
hand was there. However, in some cases participants were con-
fused regarding the localization of the tactile stimulation and the
localization of their hand: they could not determine whether they
felt the tactile stimulation on their hand or on the rubber hand.
Interestingly, they could determine that they felt the contact with
the table underneath their hand. This result suggests that while the
passive aspect of touch is delocalized toward the rubber hand, the
localization of the active aspect of touch in the illusion is not
modified by the asynchronous stroking condition.
Another peculiarity of the illusion in the asynchronous con-
dition is that some participants felt what we called “phantom
sensation.” Although these participants realized that there was no
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correspondence between the visual and tactile stimulations, some
of them had the impression of feeling on their hand what they saw
happening on the rubber hand. In two cases there were moments
at which the participants were not even able to say whether there
was an asynchronicity; in other cases the participants felt tactile
stimulation where they saw the paintbrush touching the rubber
hand, but more faintly. Lewis and Lloyd (2010) also observed this
phenomenon and this result is also in line with a finding reported
by Durgin et al. (2007) in which 61% of participants stated feeling
a sensation (thermal or touch) on their own hands when looking
at a laser beam projected onto a rubber hand.
This effect might be related to the referred sensations described
by Schaefer et al. (2006a,b) in a modified paradigm of the RHI. In
Schaefer et al. (2006b), participants were stimulated on their lit-
tle finger while watching a video showing a life-sized hand where
the index finger was stimulated. There were two conditions: one
in which the stroking of the real hand and the stroking shown in
the video were in phase and another condition in which they were
out of phase. Neuromagnetic source imaging of the topography of
the functional organization of primary somatosensory cortex (SI)
was recorded in order to investigate whether referred sensations
were related to a change in activation pattern of SI. The results
showed that participants reported feeling a tactile sensation on
the index finger rather than on the little finger in the in phase con-
dition. In addition, the extent of the cortical representation of the
little finger increased during the illusion. The authors suggested
that the conflict between vision and somatosensation results in a
referral of the perceived sensation and that this illusion is related
to short-term plasticity in SI.
In our experiment, the asynchronous condition corresponded
to stroking the rubber and the real hand at different places at
a given moment, which is similar to the in phase condition of
Schaefer et al.’s experiment. The combination of the expectation
of feeling a tactile sensation at a given place and the conflict
between vision and somatosensation might have resulted in the
described phantom sensation.
This experiential category is unique to the asynchronous con-
dition, and it suggests that although the effects are different from
those in the synchronous condition, the asynchronous condi-
tion can produce another strong illusion: the illusion of feeling
something where physically there is no tactile stimulation.
In addition, two participants described having the impres-
sion of owning a “numbed” hand at the location of the rubber
hand. One of them, who did not experience the illusion in the
synchronous condition, explained that this feeling of having a
numbed hand brought him closer to having the experience of
owning the rubber hand. The impression of having a numbed
hand involves a distinct mode of appropriation of the hand that
was identified only in the asynchronous condition.
These results, and specifically the occurrence of these last
two experiential categories, show that asynchronous stroking can
induce a very particular and complex type of illusion.
Non-stroking condition
Three out of ten participants experienced an illusion in the non-
stroking condition. In two of these cases, the experience of the
illusion shared most of the characteristics already mentioned
for the illusion in the synchronous condition. One participant’s
illusion was peculiar: he reported his experience of the incorpo-
ration of the rubber hand as being like having a prosthesis. As in
the case of feeling a numbed hand in the asynchronous condition,
we treated this experience as a distinct mode of appropriation of
the hand, and although it has different characteristics than the
illusion in the synchronous condition, it too involved a complex
illusory experience.
In summary, these results show that both the asynchronous
stroking condition and the non-stroking condition can induce an
illusion that, in some cases, involves a highly complex experience.
The number of participants who had some kind of illusory experi-
ence in the asynchronous and synchronous conditions was almost
the same. Strikingly, two of the participants who experienced
the illusion in the asynchronous condition did not experience
it in the synchronous one. In the non-stroking condition con-
siderably fewer participants experienced illusory sensations than
in the other two conditions. In contrast to the illusion in the
synchronous condition, the illusion in the asynchronous and
non-stroking conditions did not involve the disregarding of the
real hand: participants who experienced an illusion in these con-
ditions felt that the rubber hand belonged to them but at the same
time experienced the presence of their real hand. The presence
of the real hand was expressed through their ability to locate it
in space. However, in some cases (mainly in the asynchronous
condition), the participants’ experience of the illusion was charac-
terized by a confusion about the location of the tactile sensation.
Importantly, situations where the illusion was absent were also
characterized by the ability to localize their hand in space. These
results suggest that the experience of “owning” one’s body parts is
tightly linked to the ability to localize them. We observed that the
localization of one’s own body parts can involve different frames
of reference: in relation to dynamic tactile stimulation on that
part, in relation to its contact with an external surface, and in rela-
tion to the rest of the body. The contributions of these different
points of reference to the experience of ownership remain to be
assessed.
TOUCHING VS. BEING TOUCHED
The results showed that for the synchronous condition, in Phase 1
some participants described feeling the tactile sensation produced
by the paintbrush on the rubber hand while all of them described
feeling the tactile sensation produced by the contact with the table
under their real hand suggesting that at this stage, only the passive
aspect of touch is delocalized to the rubber hand. In Phase 2, all
participants felt the tactile sensation produced by the paintbrush
on the rubber hand and they also described feeling the contact
with the table under the rubber hand, suggesting that at this stage
both the passive and active aspects of touch are delocalized to the
rubber hand. In Phase 2′, which corresponds to the absence of the
illusion, neither the active aspect of touch nor the passive aspect
were transferred to the rubber hand.
In the case of the asynchronous stroking condition, the sub-
phase 5 of Phase 1 indicates that there was a confusion regarding
the location of the tactile sensation produced by the paintbrush
and of the location of the arm with respect to the rest of the
body. Contrary to what happened in the synchronous condition,
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in the asynchronous one, participants felt the tactile sensation
of the contact with the table under their real hand. This result
suggests that the illusion in the asynchronous stroking condition
differs from the illusion in the synchronous stroking condition,
in the sense that the illusion does not involve a delocalization of
the passive aspect of touch, but a “confusion” of its localization.
In addition, the illusion in the asynchronous stroking condition
does not involve delocalization of the active aspect of touch.
In the non-stroking condition, participants who experienced
the illusion described projecting the tactile sensation produced by
the paintbrush onto the rubber hand, which could be interpreted
as a type of delocalization of the passive aspect of touch toward
the rubber hand. Two participants also described feeling the con-
tact with the table under the rubber hand during the illusion.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that in the non-stroking condition
participants do not see the rubber hand being stroked, concerning
the passive and active aspects of touch, the illusion shared similar
characteristics to that elicited by synchronous stroking.
It is important to highlight that in most cases, participants’
spontaneous reports described the transfer of the passive compo-
nent of touch (the location of the tactile stimulation) rather than
the active component (the location of the contact with the table).
Only one participant spontaneously reported feeling contact with
the table under the rubber hand; in the remaining cases, this
was assessed through questions. The lack of spontaneous reports
regarding the active component of touch might be due the char-
acteristics of the experimental protocol. We will come back to this
issue in the “Limitations and future directions of research” section
at the end of the article.
In summary, if we consider the illusion elicited by the syn-
chronous stroking condition as the standard illusion, the result
indicates that the passive aspect of touch was transferred at ear-
lier stages of the illusion, and that the active aspect of touch was
transferred only once the illusion was well established. This result
might suggest a dissociation between these two aspects, and that
the active aspect of touch is more “resistant” to the illusion. This
opens up the hypothesis that the feeling of body ownership is
more strongly related with the active dimension of touch than
with the passive one.
EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE ILLUSION
The analysis of the interviews allowed identifying the generic
diachronic structure of each stroking condition. These structures
were composed by twomain phases and a series of sub phases that
account for themicrogenesis of the illusion, or for the absence of it.
The results showed that three sub-phases lead to the illusion
in the synchronous stroking condition. The association between
the visual and the tactile stimulation appears to be a key step for
the emergence of the illusion since the two participants who, after
establishing this association identified an incongruence between
the tactile and visual stimuli, did not experience the illusion.
The existence of two phases, one for establishing the visuo-
tactile association, and another for the illusion itself, is in line with
what has been found at the neural level. Evidence has shown that
activity in parietal and premotor cortex during the RHI might
be related to the multi-sensory integration that causes the illu-
sion, and that the activity of the posterior insula and operculum
is related to the sense of owning the rubber hand (Tsakiris et al.,
2007a).
These results partly confirm those of Lewis and Lloyd (2010),
and also expand on them. Lewis and Lloyd described an evolution
of the experience of the illusion in the synchronous condition.
Here, not only did we find an evolution of the emergence of
the illusion that may warrant further investigation—in addition
we described the emergence of the experience of illusion in the
asynchronous and non-stroking conditions.
Lewis and Lloyd (2010) argued that there is an ordered pro-
gression of perceptual events over the course of the illusion.
Although we found similar perceptual events, we were not able
to identify a generic ordered progression within the phases of the
illusion. They wrote that the first event in the progression is the
participants’ report of feeling a rubbery texture on their hands.
This feeling is similar to what we identified as the acquisition
of rubber hand features. Second, they said, comes ownership of
the rubber hand or the feeling that the real hand has moved to
the location of the rubber hand. These components are equiv-
alent to what we identified as the feeling of ownership of the
rubber hand and the disruption of the ability to localize the
real hand. Next, they wrote, come feelings of agency and wider
bodily changes. These components are similar to what we identi-
fied as the attribution of features of the real hand to the rubber
hand. However, in our analysis we were not able to establish a
generic order of appearance of the different components that
characterize the illusion. The method used by Lewis and Lloyd
to establish the order of the components was to look at the
time at which the description referring to the specific component
appeared in the interview. But as shown by other studies using
interviews (Jahn, 2005), the order of descriptions does not always
correspond to the order in which the experience was lived. We
reorganized participants’ description according to the order in
which the experience unfolded, and not according to the order
in which the experience was described (see Petitmengin, 2006;
Valenzuela-Moguillansky, 2012). Despite the fact that this allowed
us to identify the sequence of sub-phases of Phase 1 for each
stroking condition, we could not identify an ordered progression
in the appearance of the experiential categories that characterized
Phases 2 and 2’.
Interestingly, our results indicate that the illusion can be
elicited in the asynchronous and non-stroking conditions, even
though participants recognize the incongruence between the
visual and tactile stimuli in these conditions. In these cases, the
micro-genesis of the illusion seems to be more complex since
more sub-phases were identified. In the asynchronous condition,
the recognition of the visuo-tactile incongruence leads, in some
participants, to a confusion of the location of the tactile sensa-
tion elicited by the paintbrush. Participants who concentrated on
the visual input of the contact between the paintbrush and the
rubber hand rather than on the tactile sensation elicited by the
paintbrush on their real hand experienced the illusion, suggest-
ing that concentrating on the visual input is a key step for the
emergence of the illusion. In the non-stroking condition, after
recognizing the incongruence between the visual and tactile stim-
uli, three participants projected the tactile sensation elicited by
the paintbrush onto the rubber hand. Two of them described that
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concentrating on this sensation lead to the illusion, suggesting
that this sub-phase also had a key role for inducing the illusion
in the non-stroking condition.
In the pilot experiment that we conducted with individuals
who were trained in the elicitation technique, one participant
described in a clear way the impact of his mode of attention on
the emergence of the illusion in the synchronous stroking condi-
tion. The participant’s description suggests that, in the early stage
of the stroking period, when he did not feel yet that the rubber
hand belonged to him, the mode of attention was “global” and
his field of vision was large, as illustrated by the following extracts
of his interview:
“I focused on the hand in a global manner, (. . .) everything was
. . . uh . . . it was captured by my attention in a global way, not in a
focused way.”
“I have this hand here in my field of vision (his left hand, which is
approximately 20 cm away to the left of the rubber hand),(. . .) I see
that hand (the rubber hand), and the movement of the brush.”
“but I still feel the brush here, (indicating his right hand). . . I feel
it pretty well.”
Then, the participant’s description suggests that there is a nar-
rowing of his mode of attention and of his visual field that
accompanies the emergence of the illusion:
“And then after a while this field of vision gets narrow. It shrinks
(. . .) my visual attention is focused on the brush. . . Everything was
blurred around . . . and I felt the illusion happen.”
These descriptions suggest that there is a change in the mode of
attention and a narrowing in the visual field that facilitates the
emergence of the illusion and perhaps its maintenance. To our
knowledge previous studies have not assessed the role of attention
in the emergence and modulation of the illusion.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF RESEARCH
A clear limitation of our study is that the small number of par-
ticipants prevents the generalization of these findings to a large
population. In addition, due to the small number of participants,
we could not assess the influence of the order of the condi-
tions in the presence of some experiential categories such as the
“phantom sensation.” As stated in the results section, this expe-
riential category was present in participants who underwent the
asynchronous stroking condition after the synchronous stroking
condition. In the synchronous stroking these participants expe-
rienced the feeling of ownership of the rubber hand as well as
disownership of the real hand, determined by the experiential
categories “disregarding of the real hand,” “delocalization of the
real hand,” and “disruption of proprioception.” Using the term
employed by Lewis and Lloyd (2010) this corresponds to a recal-
ibration of the body schema, which might involve a recalibration
of the location where the tactile sensation is expected to be.
This expectation might have contributed to the presence of the
phantom sensation.
However, it is important to stress that the validity of the
results obtained through the elicitation interviews depends on the
quality of the descriptions rather than on their quantity. This dif-
ference between first and third-person approaches gives rise to
different validation frameworks, making it often difficult to inte-
grate these two approaches. We believe that the present study
is a step toward this integration and that further work needs
to be done in order to assess all the methodological as well as
epistemological issues that this integration raises.
Regarding the dissociation between the active and passive
aspects of touch, as stated in the discussion, participants did not
spontaneously report the transfer of the active component of
touch. A limitation of our study’s account of this dissociation is
that the active part of the experimental manipulation in the RHI
protocol takes place in the interaction between the paintbrush
and the hand; no manipulation occurs at the interface between
the table and the hand. Therefore, it is likely that the movements
of the paintbrush directed the participants’ attention to what was
happening on the dorsum of their hand, while what was happen-
ing on their palm and under their fingers was outside of their
focus of attention. A protocol that controls for this asymmetry
by eliciting a redirection of the participant’s attention toward the
interaction between the table and the hand, combined with inter-
views oriented to investigate this facet of experience, are needed to
further investigate the question of whether the active and passive
aspects are differently affected by the illusion.
A future direction of research concerns the role of the mode of
attention in the emergence and evolution of the illusion. Future
interviews could aim at more systematically eliciting descriptions
of the participants’ mode of attention in the different phases of
the illusion, in order to try to identify the impact of attentional
modulation on the emergence of the illusion. Furthermore, a RHI
protocol that combines this interview technique with methods
that assess the neural correlates of attention could help to clar-
ify the interactions between attention and the feeling of owning
the rubber and the real hand as well as contributing to establish-
ing the duration of the different phases of the illusion. Further
study of the impact of the mode of attention on the emergence
and permanence of the illusion could shed light on the role
played by the mode of attention in the sense of body owner-
ship. Studying the relationship between attention and the sense of
body ownership appears very relevant for a better understanding
of pain-related disruptions in body awareness. In a recent study
Valenzuela-Moguillansky (2013) described the changes experi-
enced by fibromyalgia patients over the course of a pain crisis.
Patients’ descriptions indicate that focusing attention on their
bodily sensations is followed by a disruption of the perceived
size of their painful body parts and a loss of the sense of body
ownership.
Our results also have implications for the design of future
experiments involving the RHI. First of all our results suggest
that for an experimental protocol that attempts to assess the
effect of the sense of body ownership on any dependent vari-
able, the non-stroking condition appears to be a better control
condition than the asynchronous stroking condition. Second,
inter-individual variability of the subjective experience of the
illusion should be considered when designing the protocol and
analyzing and interpreting the results. This could be done by inte-
grating a first-person approach in a first stage of the protocol to
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establish a typology of participants, for instance, in relation to
the presence or absence of the illusion in each stroking condi-
tion (see Valenzuela-Moguillansky, 2012). Taking as example the
results of the present study, the participants can be clustered into
four groups: “as expected”—the participants who experienced the
illusion in the synchronous stroking condition and who did not
experience it at all in the asynchronous and non-stroking condi-
tions; “not as expected”—the participants who did not experience
the illusion in the synchronous condition but who experienced
some illusory aspects in the asynchronous condition; “susceptible
to the illusion,”—the participants who experienced the illusion
in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions; and “very
susceptible to the illusion”—the participants who experienced the
illusion in all three stroking conditions. In this way, the hypothe-
ses would not be conceived in terms of the stroking conditions
but in terms of the typology of participants. Accordingly, the
impact of the illusion should not be assessed by averaging the data
of a given dependent variable by condition, but considering this
typology.
This approach of course presents some challenges. First, as
the division of the participants by types would reduce the num-
ber of participants per group, the study should involve a large
number of participants in order to have statistically significant
results. Second, the integration of a first-person approach involves
the inclusion of a first phase of interviews and their analysis in
order to establish the typologies. However, the experience that
participants have of each stroking condition might be differ-
ent from the one in the actual experiment. Still, the prospect of
designing experiments that consider the complexity of the expe-
rience that they claim to assess is worth the effort of facing these
challenges.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the use of a first-person approach, particularly the
elicitation interview, allowed us to investigate and reveal aspects
of the RHI such as the richness of the experience elicited by
the different stroking conditions, and the presence of different
phases in the genesis of the illusion which are usually concealed by
the focalization on the final content of the illusion (Petitmengin
and Lachaux, 2013). These had not previously been highlighted
through the use of questionnaires. These findings enable us to
refine both our understanding of the components of the feeling
of body ownership and also the microdynamics of constitution of
this feeling.
The basic implications of the results of the present study are,
first, that the illusion induced by the synchronous stroking con-
dition involves ownership of the rubber hand and disownership
of the real hand, meaning that the illusion probably involves
a replacement of the real hand by the rubber hand in partici-
pants’ body schema, and not an addition of a third limb. Second,
the study shows that the feeling of owning the rubber hand can
be induced not only by synchronous stroking but also by asyn-
chronous stroking and, to a lesser extent, in the non-stroking con-
dition. In addition, the illusions induced by the asynchronous and
non-stroking conditions have their own characteristics, which
probably explains why they are not highlighted by the classic
questionnaire used in experiments involving the RHI. Third, the
cases of presence and absence of the illusion showed that the expe-
rience of hand ownership seems to be tightly linked to the ability
to localize the hand in space. Fourth, we could identify differ-
ent phases and sub-phases in the micro-genesis of the illusion
that indicate that the passive aspect of touch was transferred at
earlier stages of the illusion, and that the active aspect of touch
was transferred only at a later stage. Finally, our findings are rel-
evant at a methodological level. Taking into account the fact that
the different stroking conditions can elicit different types of illu-
sions, and that their emergence involves different phases, modifies
the way in which an experimental protocol involving the RHI
should be designed, and the way its results should be analyzed
and interpreted.
A better understanding of the sense of body ownership might
have clinical implications. In recent years, several studies have
shown a relationship between chronic pain conditions and a dis-
ruption in different aspect of body awareness (e.g., Schwoebel
et al., 2001; Förderreuther et al., 2004; Altschuler and Hu, 2008;
Moseley et al., 2008b), particularly in the sense of body ownership
(e.g., Galer and Jensen, 1999) and in the ability to localize the
painful body parts (e.g., Sumitani et al. (2007). However, so far
the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well under-
stood. Gaining understanding in the emergence of the sense of
body ownership and its relationship with the ability to localize
one’s own body in space might contribute to better understand
the relationship between chronic pain and disruptions in body
awareness. Finally, in more general terms, a better comprehension
of the components of body ownership and its micro-dynamics
are crucial to advance the understanding of the sense of self, issue
which is today at the core of many of the questions of cognitive
science.
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APPENDIX
ANALYSIS OF THE ELICITATION INTERVIEWS
The analysis of the interviews involves a recursive process of suc-
cessive operations of abstraction and comparison. In what follows
we will explain howwe identified a generic structure of the experi-
ence in each visuo-tactile condition using the gathered data. The
method that we used was based on the analytical methodology
proposed by Petitmengin (1999, 2001).
Transcription of the interviews and division of the text
The first step of the analysis involved transcribing the inter-
views and numbering the lines of the transcription. This makes it
possible to return to the original data once the extracts of descrip-
tions are chosen and reorganized. After reading the interview,
we divided the text in the descriptions according to each of the
stroking conditions.
Identification and selection of the relevant part of the text
Different types of information compose interviewees’ discourse,
and only part of this information is considered in the analy-
sis. The analysis component of the elicitation interview method
suggests selecting only the fragments describing the interviewee’s
sequence of actions and the qualitative aspects of their experi-
ence, leaving aside information such as the context in which the
experience occurs, or representations that we have about it, or
theoretical knowledge related to the experience, which are con-
sidered “satellite information” (Vermersch, 2011). The selected
fragments, called “descriptive statements,” are factual descrip-
tions, as non-interpretative as possible, that refer to a particular
experience and that are produced while in a state of evocation
(Vermersch, 2009). Evocation refers to recalling a given experi-
ence as if re-enacting it. Because in the present experiment many
of the descriptions were “in real time,” in addition to the descrip-
tive statements, “in real time” descriptions that did not contain
satellite information were also selected.
Identification of underlying structure in the experience
Once the relevant content of the interview was extracted, we pro-
ceeded to identify the underlying structure of the experience.
By structure we refer to “a network of relationships between
descriptive categories, independent of the experiential content,”
as defined by Delattre (1971).
First stage in the establishment of the experiential categories in
individual experiences. Once we had selected the relevant part
of the text for each interview, we identified descriptive statements
referring to qualitative features of the experience and we grouped
them according to different “experiential categories.” An experi-
ential category is a class that groups together descriptive interview
extracts that have a relevant aspect in common. This process of
abstraction is called “instantiation.” For instance, from the fol-
lowing extracts, two descriptive statements which were classified
under the experiential category “feeling of ownership” aremarked
in italics.
- “I don’t have the impression of a transfer of the hand, but
directly that it’s this hand that’s mine, the fake hand” (V.C.)
- “Because I really really have the impression that it [the rubber
hand] belongs to me” (V.C.)
This stage represents a first step in organizing the data; the
established experiential categories changed during the following
steps of analysis. After grouping and labeling all the descriptive
statements from each interview, we proceeded to reorganize the
description.
Reorganization of the text. In the cases of verbalizations that
were not produced “in real time,” the order of the description
often did not correspond to the order of the lived experience, thus
it was important to reorganize the text according to the chronol-
ogy of the experience. In some cases, this is due to the fact
that initially the interviewee gave a global outline of the sit-
uation and then, during the interview, different parts of the
experience were explored in more detail. In other cases, the inter-
viewee might have initially described aspects of the experience
that were more salient to her and then, in later stages of the
interview, pre-reflective aspects might emerge. For instance, one
participant first referred to the impression that the rubber hand
belonged to her. This impression was what first popped out in
her experience. But then, as the interview continued, she referred
to a more subtle aspect of her experience that took place at
the beginning of the stroking period: her internal attitude of
putting herself in a state of having no expectations regarding the
experiment.
Identification of the diachronic structure of an individual expe-
rience. Once the identified experiential categories were organized
in sequential order, we proceeded to establish the diachronic
structure of individual experiences. The diachronic structure
is the set of different phases in the evolution of the experi-
ence. In order to do this, we looked for the participant’s “inner
gestures” or for markers that indicate a change in the par-
ticipant’s perception. Continuing on with the previous exam-
ple, from the descriptive statements selected for participant
V.C., we identified inner gestures and changes in perception
that led to the establishment of the following two phases of
the experience of the synchronous stroking. We gave each
phase a name or label, usually on the basis of the descriptive
statements:
Phase 1: “Association of visual and tactile stimuli”
Descriptive statements:
“I completely associate what I see with what I feel.” (124)3
“My sensation is exactly the same as what I see” (122)
In this case the inner gesture would be “I associate.”
Phase 2: “Illusion”
Descriptive statements:
- “Because [I really really have the impression that it] the
rubber hand belongs to me too” (147)
3At the end of each descriptive statement, the number of the corresponding
line in the transcription is indicated in parentheses.
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- “It’s pretty bizarre because I forget that I have this right hand.”
(142)
- “They become unified, almost as if it were the same hand, but
united in two, it’s really, it’s fairly bizarre” (141)
In this case, rather than an inner gesture, what defined the phase
was a change in the participant’s perception regarding the rubber
hand. The change in perception was the impression of owning the
rubber hand.
Second stage in the establishment of the experiential categories:
identification of the synchronic structure of an individual expe-
rience. The identification of the synchronic structure refers to
the recognition of the different components that characterize the
interviewee’s experience in a given phase. It is like “zooming in”
on a particular phase, to identify and categorize the qualitative
aspects that give its identity.
At this stage, through processes of “aggregation” and “gener-
alization” we grouped together the previously identified experi-
ential categories into experiential categories of a higher order of
abstraction. Aggregation refers to “an operation of abstraction
through which a relationship between objects is regarded as a
higher-level object” (Smith and Smith, 1977). On the other hand,
generalization refers “to an operation of abstraction in which
a set of similar objects is regarded as a generic object” (Smith
and Smith, 1977). For instance, in the example given above, the
“illusion” phase contained three descriptive statements: (147),
(142), and (141). In the establishment of the synchronic struc-
ture of this phase, each of these statements was classified through
a process of aggregation under the three experiential categories:
“feeling of ownership of the rubber hand,” “disregarding the
real hand,” and “impression of unification of the real and
rubber hand.”
The aggregation and generalization processes can be ascen-
dant or descendent (Petitmengin, 2001). The categorization is
ascendant when we start from the text and progressively estab-
lish categories at a higher and higher level of abstraction. The
categorization is descendant when we predefine the categories
and classify the text according to the chosen definition. In the
case of the present study, some of the experiential categories
were classified through an ascendant categorization and others
through a descendant categorization. For instance, as explained
above, some questions were pre-established based on pilot exper-
iments. These questions led to the emergence of experiential
categories through a descendent process. Others, such as “dis-
regarding the real hand,” were identified through an ascen-
dant process. In some cases, categories that emerged from the
participants’ descriptions were used as guides for later inter-
views. For instance, as explained in the introduction to the
article, the distinction between the felt position of the con-
tact of the paintbrush on the hand (rubber or real) and the
felt position of the contact of the hand with the table (under
the rubber or the real hand) emerged from the experience of
one participant and thereafter was systematically assessed in
the interviews. In these cases, subsequent descriptions regard-
ing this distinction were categorized according to a descendent
classification.
Describing the general structure of the experience of each visuo
tactile condition.
Comparison of the individuals’ diachronic structures. The aim
of the description of the generic diachronic structure is to identify
the invariant among the different experiences by comparing the
diachronic structures of individuals.
In order to do so, we grouped together the descriptive state-
ments we would use to identify the landmarks of each phase in
the individual experiences and also the labels of each phase of the
individual experiences. We then determined the invariants and
possible variants of the experiences
We identified two possible criteria for selecting the final
generic structure: an “exclusive” and an “inclusive” criterion. The
exclusive criterion would select only the phases that appeared
most frequently in participants’ descriptions. The inclusive cri-
terion would consider all the phases identified in the partici-
pants’ descriptions. As the character of the present study was
exploratory, and the participants had different levels of expertise
in describing their experience, we decided to adopt an inclusive
criterion in order to consider infrequent aspects of the experience
for future inquiry.
The following is an example of the generic diachronic structure
identified in the individual structures of participants C.G, H.M.,
C.V., M.W, and, I.P.:
C.G.
Phase 1: Recognition of correspondence between the visual and
tactile stimuli
Sub phase 1: Feeling the tactile sensation of the paintbrush
Sub phase 2: Association of the visual and tactile stimuli
Sub phase 3: Beginning of rubber hand incorporation
Phase 2: Illusion
H.M.
Phase 1: Recognition of correlation between the visual and tactile
stimuli
Sub phase 1: Association of the visual and tactile stimuli
Sub phase 2: Beginning of rubber hand incorporation
Phase 2: Illusion
C.V.
Phase 1: Recognition of correlation between the visual and tactile
stimuli
Sub phase 1: Association of the visual and tactile stimuli
Sub phase 2: Beginning of rubber hand incorporation
Sub phase 3: Violation of expectation
Phase 2′: Absence of the illusion
M.W.
Phase 1: Recognition of correlation between the visual and tactile
stimuli
Sub phase 1: Beginning of rubber hand incorporation
Sub phase 2: Violation of expectation
Phase 2′: Absence of the illusion
I.P.
Phase 1: Recognition of correspondence between the visual and
tactile stimuli
Sub phase 1: Feeling the tactile sensation of the paintbrush
Sub phase 2: Association of the visual and tactile stimuli
Sub phase 3: Beginning of rubber hand incorporation
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Phase 2: Illusion
Comparing the diachronic structure of these participants in
the synchronous stroking condition, we observe that G.G. and
I.P.’s sub phase 1 is not present for the other three participants,
that sub phase 2 for G.G. and I.P and Phase 1 for H.M. and
C.V. seem to be equivalents, and that the presence of sub phase
“violation of expectation” in participants C.V. and M.W. leads to
Phase 2′.
Thus, a generic (inclusive) diachronic structure here would be
a) In the case that the illusion is elicited:
Phase 1: Recognition of correspondence between the visual and
tactile stimuli
Sub phase 1: Feeling the tactile sensation of the paintbrush
Sub phase 2: Association of the visual and tactile stimuli
Sub phase 3: Beginning of rubber hand incorporation
Phase 2: Illusion
(b) In the case that the illusion is not elicited:
Phase 1: Recognition of correlation between the visual and tactile
stimuli
Sub phase 1: Feeling the tactile sensation of the
paintbrush
Sub phase 2: Association of the visual and tactile stimuli
Sub phase 3: Beginning of rubber hand incorporation
Sub phase 4: Violation of expectation
Phase 2′: Absence of the illusion
Comparison of the individuals’ synchronic structures. Once
the individuals’ descriptions were divided into phases and a
generic diachronic structure was identified, we compared the
experiential categories that characterized each phase for each
participant. Again through a process of aggregation and gener-
alization, experiential categories of similar class were grouped
together under experiential categories at a higher level of
abstraction.
Like the establishment of the generic diachronic structure,
the establishment of the generic synchronic structure was inclu-
sive, meaning that all the experiential categories that had been
identified in the specific experiences were taken into account
in the generic structure, even if they had appeared only in one
experience.
For instance, the illusion phase of C.G., I.Q., H.M. and D.L.
was characterized by the following experiential categories, respec-
tively:
C.G.
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand
Acquisition of rubber hand features
Losing ownership of the real hand
I.Q.
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand
Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand
Disregarding the real hand
H.M.
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand
Feeling only the rubber hand
D.L.
Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand
Acquisition of rubber hand features
Feeling only the rubber hand
Delocalization of the real hand
I.P.
Disruption of the ability to determine the position of the real
hand
Feeling only the rubber hand
Acquisition of rubber hand features
Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand
Thus, after the processes of comparison, aggregation and gener-
alization, the generic synchronic structure of the illusion phase
was:
– Feeling of ownership of the rubber hand
– Disregarding the real hand
– Delocalization of the real hand
– Disruption of proprioception
– Attribution of real hand features to the rubber hand
– Acquisition of rubber hand features
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